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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATTON LEAVER and 
MARGE LEAVER, 
Plaint iff-Appellants, 
vs. 
RUTH GROSE, 
[Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
14722 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to enforce restrictive covenants of 
Loganview Subdivision located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to 
enjoin the Respondent from utilizing a residence located in that sub-
division as a duplex dwelling. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The Plaint iff-Appellants moved the lower court for 
partial summary judgment determining that the restrictive covenants 
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were currently enforceable to enjoin the Defendant-Respondent from 
converting a single family residential dwelling to a duplex rental unit. 
(R. 19) 
Upon hearing of the motion the Court entered its Order 
on July 27, 1976, denying motion of the Plaintiff-Appellants and deter-
mining that the restrictive covenants are not enforceable as against 
violations of said restrictions either committed or attempted after 
date of May 12, 1972. (R. 31) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Respondent seeks to sustain the Order 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant-Respondent agrees with the Statement 
of Facts as set forth in the brief of the Appellants, except wherein it 
is stated that the lower court determined that the restrictive covenants 
had expired on the date of May 12, 1972, and do respectively show that 
the ruling of the court was that the said restrictions are not enforce-
able after date of May 12, 1972, (R. 31) the pleadings before the court 
having shown that the alterations and modifications made by the Defendant-
Respondent and of which the Plaintiff-Appellants complain, were not 
commenced until June 30, 1975. (R. 13) 
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ARGUMENT 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS CON-
STITUTED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO 
THE RESPONDENT THAT THEY WERE 
ENFORCEABLE ONLY AS TO VIOLATIONS 
COMMITTED PRIOR TO MAY 12, 1972 
AND THEREFORE ARE NOT ENFORCE-
ABLE AFTER THAT DATE. 
Restrictive covenants are not strictly an easement in 
the general view of the Courts and do not run with the land in the true 
sense of the term, but such agreements are enforceable in equity and 
enforcement is based upon the equitable principal of notice. 20 Am 
Jur 2d, Covenants, Section 304. That is to say, the person against 
whom the covenant is sought to be enforced must have had either con-
structive or actual notice of the restrictive covenant. 
In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P2d 781, this Court 
considered the elements which must be found to be present in determin-
ing whether restrictive covenants of a subdivision were enforceable as 
between subsequent purchasers of lots in that subdivision. Therein the 
Court determined: 
"The cases appear to be unanimous in supporting 
the proposition that if a general scheme for build-
ing or development is intended by the original 
Grantor, subsequent Grantees may bring action 
against each other to enforce the restrictive cov-
enant. This intent may be gathered from the 
Grantor's acts and attendant circumstances. Con-
structive or actual notice of the general plan on 
the part of the Grantee is an essential requirement 
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< 
in enforcing the restrictive covenant. M (Emphasis 
added.) 169 P2d 783, 784 
Therefore, the Respondent took title to her property 
subject only to the specific terms and conditions of the restrictive 
covenants of which she then had notice and said restrictive covenants 
are enforceable against her only to the extent of the notice conveyed 
and received. 
Section XIV of the Building Restrictions provides as 
follows: 
If the parties now claiming any interest in said 
residential lots hereinbefore described, or any 
of them, or their heirs, successors, grantees, 
personal representatives or assigns, shall violate 
or attempt to violate any of the covenants and re-
strictions herein contained prior to twenty"- five 
(25) years from the date hereof, it shall be lawful 
for any other person or persons owning any other 
residential lot or lots in said area to prosecute 
any proceedings at law or in equity against the 
person or persons, firms or corporations so 
violating or attempting to violate any such cove-
nant or covenants and/or restrictions or restriction, 
and either prevent him or them from so doing or to 
recover damages or other dues for such violation or 
violations. (Emphasis added.) (R. 22) 
The Building Restrictions were dated and recorded on 
May 12, 1947. (R. 20, 22) Therefore, Section XIV now does and always 
has constituted clear and concise notice that the covenants were to be 
enforced only as against violations committed or attempted prior to 
May 12, 1972. 
The Appellants correctly assert that the lower court was 
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required to find that the Respondent had constructive notice of the 
restrictive covenants. The Court was neither called upon to rule 
nor did it in fact rule that the Respondent had no notice of the pro-
visions of the restrictive covenants, but rather ruled that the notice 
given to and received by the Respondent constituted notice that the 
restrictive covenants would not be enforced as to violations or 
attempted violations occuring after May 12, 1972, and therefore, 
that the restrictions were enforceable against the Respondent only 
to the extent of the notice given and received and therefore, that 
the same were not enforceable after May 12, 1972. 
The Appellants further contend that restrictive cove-
nants are enforceable without an express grant of authority, that it 
is not necessary that the covenants specifically set forth an enforce-
ment clause and therefore, that the subject covenants are enforceable 
notwithstanding the provisions of Section XIV. However, the question 
presented is not the effect and enforceability of covenants in the 
absence of an enforcement clause, but whether the specific provisions 
of an existant clause are to be ignored and whether the subsequent 
Grantee shall have constructive notice that such a clause is not to be 
construed to mean that which it does specifically provide. 
It is further argued that Section XIV of the restrictive 
covenants is only a TTsurplus paragraph" and has no effect or bearing 
on the balance of the restrictions. However, the provisions of said 
i— 
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paragraph are as concisely and specifically stated as are the other 
paragraphs of the restrictions and any subsequent Grantee acquiring 
property in the subdivision with constructive notice of those restr ic-
tions is entitled to take in reliance upon the specific provisions of that 
paragraph. 
The Appellants contend that those who drafted and 
executed the restrictions over 29 years ago did not intend the limi-
tation which they clearly set forth in paragraph XIV. They request 
the Court to presume that those initially executing and recording the 
same did not intend the subject limitation on enforcement and there-
fore, that neither the Respondent nor any other person so situated, 
is entitled to reply on the clear and concise language of that limitation. 
At 20 Am Jur 2d, Covenants, Section 185, the author 
therein writes: 
"Rules governing the construction of covenants 
imposing restrictions on the use of land are 
generally the same as those applicable to any 
contract or covenant, including the rule that 
where there is no ambiguity in the language 
used, there is no room for construction, and 
the plain meaning of the language governs/ ' 
In Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P2d 155, this 
Court held as follows: 
• ". . . . whatever language is employed in 
stating a restriction, such language is to be 
taken in its ordinary and generally understood 
and popular sense, and is not to be subjected 
to technical refinement nor the words torn 
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from their association and their separate 
meanings sought in a lexicon.ff 423 P2d 
163 
The Appellants stress that it is necessary to determine 
the time frame that the original makers of the restrictive covenants 
intended at the time of the execution and filing of said covenants on 
May 12, 1947. In that regard, it is claimed that since a majority of 
the land owners in the subdivision did not vote to terminate the cove-
nants prior to May 12, 1972, that the same were automatically extended 
to date of May 12, 1982. It is asserted that this fact alone made the 
covenants enforceable against violations committed after May 12, 1972, 
regardless of the specific enforcement provisions as contained in Section 
XIV of the covenants. Appellants point to the fact that similar cove-
nants containing a similar enforcement clause were up held by this 
Court in Freeman v. Gee, Supra. However, that case is to be dis-
tinguished, since the violations sought to be enjoined were attempted 
prior to the expiration of the initial 25 year period as specified in the 
enforcement clause. 
Although there is neither an ambiguity nor uncertainty 
in the language of the limitation, nevertheless the Appellants request 
the Court to find an ambiguity in order to venture beyond the clear 
language of the document and to presume a meaning contrary to what 
is specifically stated. However, even if the subject limitation is con-
sidered as unclear or ambiguous, uniformly adopted rules of construction 
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would dictate that the subject restrictions are not now enforceable 
against this Respondent. 
The Courts have uniformly held that where because 
of the ambiguous language of a covenant or restriction, it is nec-
essary to apply rules of construction, such restrictions are strictly 
construed against limitations upon the use of real property and that 
any doubt will be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the 
property. 20 Am Jur 2d Covenants, Section 187. In Parrish v. 
Richards, 8 U2d 419, 336 P2d 122 our Court determined: 
MThe trial court followed the correct doctrine 
that in the construction of uncertain or am-
biguous restrictions the Courts will resolve 
all doubt in favor of the free and unrestricted 
use of property, . . .M 336 P2d 123 
The petition of the Appellants for the enforcement of 
the restrictive covenants constitutes a prayer for specific performance 
thereby requiring the application of the principals of equity inherent in 
any specific performance action. This Court, following the unanimous 
position of the Courts of other jurisdictions, has refused to make or 
modify agreements between the parties standing before it and has 
decreed specific performance oily where the terms of the agreement 
are clear. In Eckard v, Smith, (Utah 1974) 527 P2d 660, the Court 
held: 
r ''Specific performance cannot be granted 
unless the terms are clear, and that clarity 
must be found from the language used in the 
document." 527 P2d 662 
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The same principal was manifest by the Court in Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 
18 U2d 368, 423 P2d 491, wherein the Court in quoting from 29 Am Jur 
Specific Performance, Section 22, stated: 
Mthe contract must be free from doubt, 
vagueness, and ambiguity, so as to 
leave nothing to conjecture or to be 
supplied by the Court.Tt 423 P2d 493 
The Respondent respectfully submits that paragraph XIV 
of the restrictive covenants provided clear and concise notice to the 
Respondent and to all other parties similarly situated that said restric-
tive covenants were to be enforced only as against violations or attempted 
violations of the restrictions committed prior to May 12, 1972, that this 
Respondent took title to her property in Loganview Subdivision with notice 
that said restrictions were not enforceable after May 12, 1972, and that 
the same are not enforceable against her to enjoin her use of the property 
undertaken after date of May 12, 1972. 
CONCLUSION 
In order for the lower court to have determined that the 
restrictive covenants are enforceable after May 12, 1972, it would have 
been required to have presumed that the original parties executing and 
recording the restrictive covenants did not intend that which was specifi-
cally and clearly stated and that the Respondent was responsible to have 
known the unexpressed intent entertained over 29 years ago by those 
original parties. In determining the restrictions to be unenforceable, 
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the Court was not required to entertain any presumption or apply any 
rule of construction, but rather to only accept what the restrictions 
clearly and concisely provided. 
The Respondent respectfully submits that this Court 
should sustain the order of the lower court determining that the re-
strictive covenants of Loganview Subdivision are not enforceable after 
May 12, 1972. 
Respectfully submitted, 
. ^ ^ . 
Gary A ./Weston 
205 Metropolitan Law Building 
4aKSouth Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
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